

In-person session 5

September 19, 2022

PMAP 8521: Program evaluation
Andrew Young School of Policy Studies

Plan for today

DAGs, continued

Potential outcomes vs. do() notation


do-calculus, adjustment, and CATEs

Logic models, DAGs, and measurement

DAGs, continued

Effect of race on police use of force using administrative data

Effect of race on police use of force using administrative data



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Administrative Records Mask Racially Biased Policing

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Researchers often lack the necessary data to credibly estimate racial discrimination in policing. In particular, police administrative records lack information on civilians police observe but do not investigate. In this article, we show that if police racially discriminate when choosing whom to investigate, analyses using administrative records to estimate racial discrimination in police behavior are statistically biased, and many quantities of interest are unidentified—even among investigated individuals—absent strong and untestable assumptions. Using principal stratification in a causal mediation framework, we derive the exact form of the statistical bias that results from traditional estimation. We develop a bias-correction procedure and nonparametric sharp bounds for race effects, replicate published findings, and show the traditional estimator can severely underestimate levels of racially biased policing or mask discrimination entirely. We conclude by outlining a general and feasible design for future studies that is robust to this inferential snare.

Concern over racial bias in policing, and the public availability of large administrative data sets documenting police–civilian interactions, have prompted a raft of studies attempting to quantify the effect of civilian race on law enforcement behavior. These studies consider a range of outcomes including ticketing, stop duration, searches, and the use of force (e.g., Antonovics and Knight 2009; Fryer 2019; Ridgeway 2006; Nix et al. 2017). Most research in this area attempts to adjust for omitted variables that may correlate with suspect race and the outcome of interest. In contrast, this study addresses a more fundamental problem that remains even if the vexing issue of omitted variable bias is solved: the inevitable statistical bias that results from studying racial discrimination using records that are themselves the product of racial discrimination (Angrist and Pischke 2008; Elwert and Winship 2014; Rosenbaum 1984). We show that when there is any

biased absent additional data and/or strong and untestable assumptions.

This study makes several contributions. We clarify the causal estimands of interest in the study of racially discriminatory policing—quantities that many studies appear to be targeting, but are rarely made explicit—and show that the conventional approach fails to recover any known causal quantity in reasonable settings. Next, we highlight implicit and highly implausible assumptions in prior work and derive the statistical bias when they are violated. We proceed to develop informative nonparametric sharp bounds for the range of possible race effects, apply these in a reanalysis and extension of a prominent article on police use of force (Fryer 2019), and present bias-corrected results that suggest this and similar studies drastically underestimate the level of racial bias in police–civilian interactions. Finally, we outline strategies for future data collection and re-

Smoking → Cardiac arrest example

**How can you be sure
you include everything in a DAG?**

How do you know when to stop?

**Is there a rule of thumb
for the number of nodes?**

Why can we combine nodes in a DAG if they don't represent the same concept?

Why include unmeasurable things in a DAG?

Why do DAGs have to be acyclic?

What if there really is reverse causation?

**How do we actually
adjust for these things?**


Potential outcomes vs. `do()` notation

Expectations

$E(\cdot)$, $\mathbf{E}(\cdot)$, $\mathbb{E}(\cdot)$ vs. $P(\cdot)$

Basically a fancy way of saying "average"

Outcomes and programs



Causal effects with potential outcomes

Potential outcomes notation:

$$\delta = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)$$

or alternatively with **E**

$$\delta = \mathbf{E}[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)]$$

Causal effects with do()

Pearl notation:

$$\delta = \mathbf{E}[Y_i \mid \text{do}(X = 1) - Y_i \mid \text{do}(X = 0)]$$

or more simply

$$\delta = \mathbf{E}[Y_i \mid \text{do}(X)]$$

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{E}[Y_i \mid \text{do}(X)] \\ &= \\ & \mathbf{E}[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)] \end{aligned}$$

We can't see this

$$\mathbf{E}[Y_i \mid \text{do}(X)] \quad \text{or} \quad \mathbf{E}[Y_i(1) - Y_i(0)]$$

So we find the average causal effect (ACE)

$$\hat{\delta} = \mathbf{E}[Y_i \mid X = 1] - \mathbf{E}[Y_i \mid X = 0]$$

The average
population-level
change in y when
directly intervening
(or doing) x

$$\mathbf{E}(y \mid \text{do}(x))$$

Causation

The average
population-level
change in y when
accounting for
observed x

$$\mathbf{E}(y \mid x)$$

Correlation

\neq

do-calculus, adjustment, and CATEs

DAGs and identification

DAGs are a statistical tool, but they don't tell you what statistical method to use

DAGs help you with the identification strategy



Thomas Massie ✓
@RepThomasMassie



Over 70% of Americans who died with COVID, died on Medicare, and some people want [#MedicareForAll](#) ?

11:00 AM · Feb 9, 2022 · Twitter for iPhone

Easist identification

Identification through research design

RCTs

When treatment is randomized, delete all arrows going into it

No need for any do-calculus!

Most other identification

Identification through do-calculus

Rules for graph surgery

Backdoor adjustment and frontdoor adjustment
are special common patterns of do-calculus

Where can we learn more about *do*-calculus?

Here!

The do-calculus Let G be a CGM, $G_{\overline{T}}$ represent G post-intervention (i.e with all links into T removed) and $G_{\underline{T}}$ represent G with all links out of T removed. Let $do(t)$ represent intervening to set a single variable T to t .

Rule 1: $\mathbb{P}(y|do(t), z, w) = \mathbb{P}(y|do(t), z)$ if $Y \perp\!\!\!\perp W|(Z, T)$ in $G_{\overline{T}}$

Rule 2: $\mathbb{P}(y|do(t), z) = \mathbb{P}(y|t, z)$ if $Y \perp\!\!\!\perp T|Z$ in $G_{\underline{T}}$

Rule 3: $\mathbb{P}(y|do(t), z) = \mathbb{P}(y|t, z)$ if $Y \perp\!\!\!\perp T|Z$ in $G_{\overline{T}}$,

Supplement 2. The do-calculus

The *do*-calculus is an axiomatic system for replacing probability formulas with operators with ordinary conditional probabilities. It consists of three axiom schemas that have graphical criteria for when certain substitutions may be made.

Where G is the ADMG on variable set V , and P satisfies (MC - d -separation), the rules are:

Rule 1 (Insertion/deletion of observations)

$P(Y | do(X), Z, W) = P(Y | do(X), W)$ if Y and Z are d -separated by $X \cup W$ in G^* , where G^* is obtained from G by removing all arrows pointing into variables in X .

Rule 2 (Action/observation exchange)

$P(Y | do(X), do(Z), W) = P(Y | do(X), Z, W)$ if Y and Z are d -separated by $X \cup W$ in G obtained from G by removing all arrows pointing into variables in X and all arrows pointing out of variables in Z .

Rule 3 (Insertion/deletion of actions)

$P(Y | do(X), do(Z), W) = P(Y | do(X), do(Z), W)$ if Y and Z are d -separated by $X \cup W$ in G obtained from G by removing all arrows pointing into variables in X and all arrows pointing out of variables in Z .

Rule 1 (Insertion/deletion of observations):

$$P(y|do(x), z, w) = P(y|do(x), w) \quad \text{if } (Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z|X, W)_{G_{\overline{X}}} \quad (3)$$

Rule 2 (Action/observation exchange):

$$P(y|do(x), do(z), w) = P(y|do(x), z, w) \quad \text{if } (Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z|X, W)_{G_{\overline{X}, \underline{Z}}} \quad (4)$$

Rule 3 (Insertion/deletion of actions):

$$P(y|do(x), do(z), w) = P(y|do(x), do(z), w) \quad \text{if } (Y \perp\!\!\!\perp Z|X, W)_{G_{\overline{X}, \underline{Z}}} \quad (5)$$

Theorem 6.2 (Rules of do-calculus) Given a causal graph G , an associated distribution P , and disjoint sets of variables Y, T, Z , and W , the following rules hold.

Rule 1:

$$P(y | do(t), z, w) = P(y | do(t), w) \quad \text{if } Y \perp\!\!\!\perp_{G_{\overline{T}}} Z | T, W \quad (6.18)$$

Rule 2:

$$P(y | do(t), do(z), w) = P(y | do(t), z, w) \quad \text{if } Y \perp\!\!\!\perp_{G_{\overline{T}, \underline{Z}}} Z | T, W \quad (6.19)$$

Rule 3:

$$P(y | do(t), do(z), w) = P(y | do(t), w) \quad \text{if } Y \perp\!\!\!\perp_{G_{\overline{T}, \underline{Z}(W)}} Z | T, W \quad (6.20)$$

where $\underline{Z}(W)$ is the set of nodes of Z that aren't ancestors of any node in W .

Rule 1: Decide if we can ignore an observation

$$P(y \mid z, \text{do}(x), w) = P(y \mid \text{do}(x), w) \quad \text{if } (Y \perp Z \mid W, X)_{G_{\overline{X}}}$$

Rule 2: Decide if we can treat an intervention as an observation

$$P(y \mid \text{do}(z), \text{do}(x), w) = P(y \mid z, \text{do}(x), w) \quad \text{if } (Y \perp Z \mid W, X)_{G_{\overline{X}, \underline{Z}}}$$

Rule 3: Decide if we can ignore an intervention

$$P(y \mid \text{do}(z), \text{do}(x), w) = P(y \mid \text{do}(x), w) \quad \text{if } (Y \perp Z \mid W, X)_{G_{\overline{X}, \overline{Z(W)}}}$$

[Marginalization across z + chain rule for conditional probabilities]

$$P(y \mid \text{do}(x)) = \sum_z P(y \mid \text{do}(x), z) \times P(z \mid \text{do}(x))$$

[Use Rule 2 to treat $\text{do}(x)$ as x]

$$= \sum_z P(y \mid x, z) \times P(z \mid \text{do}(x))$$

[Use Rule 3 to nuke $\text{do}(x)$]

$$= \sum_z P(y \mid x, z) \times P(z \mid \text{nothing!})$$

[Final backdoor adjustment formula!]

$$= \sum_z P(y \mid x, z) \times P(z)$$

Adjusting for backdoor confounding

Adjusting for frontdoor confounding

**More complex DAGs without
obvious backdoor or frontdoor solutions**

**Chug through the rules of do-calculus
to see if the relationship is identifiable**

Causal Fusion

Fusion^(β)

Summary

Treatment X

Outcome Y

Adjusted :

Query : $P_X(Y)$

Show More Details

Editor

Graphical

Structural

Refresh

```

1 <NODES>
2 X  -100,75
3 Y  100,75
4 Z   0,-75
5
6 <EDGES>
7 X -> Y
8 Z -> X
9 Z -> Y

```

14

A

Confounding Analysis

Admissible Sets

Admissibility Test

Instrumental Variables

IV Admissibility Test

Path Analysis

D-Separation

Causal Paths

Confounding Paths

Biasing Paths

Do-Calculus Analysis

Do-Inspector

Do-Separation

σ -Calculus Analysis

σ -Inspector

σ -Separation

Compute


The causal effect of on conditional on with do :

(Query: $P_X(Y)$) Non-Parametric ☒

Clear

1

$$P_X(Y) = \sum_Z P(Y|X, Z) P(Z)$$



Load

Estimation

Derivation

Remove

Simplified

Obtained by Back-Door adjustment with an admissible set $\{Z\}$

Do-Calculus



$\square P_X(Y)$ (1)

$\square \sum_Z P_X(Y|Z) P_X(Z)$ Summing over: Z (2)


$\square \sum_Z P(Y|X, Z) P_X(Z)$ Rule 2: $(X \perp Y|Z)_{G_X}$ (3)


$\square \sum_Z P(Y|X, Z) P(Z)$ Rule 3: $(X \perp Z)_{G_{\bar{X}}}$ (4)

Finally we get: $\sum_Z P(Y|X, Z) P(Z)$

Subgraph:

☐ Show non-active nodes/edges





Compute

The causal effect of

X

on

Y


conditional on

with do :



(Query: $P_X(Y)$)


Non-Parametric



Clear

1

$P_X(Y)$ is not identifiable from $P(V_1, V_2, V_3, V_4, X, Y, Z)$ and $P_X(V_1, V_2, V_3,$



Load

Remove

**When things are identified, there are
still arrows leading into Y.
What do we do with those?
How do you explain those relationships?**

**Outcomes have multiple causes.
How do you justify that your proposed
cause is the most causal factor?**

Why can't we just subtract the averages between treated and untreated groups?

When you're making groups for CATE, how do you decide what groups to put people in?

Slides from lecture

Unconfoundedness assumption

How can we assume/pretend that treatment was randomly assigned within each age?

It seems unlikely. Wouldn't there be other factors within the older/younger group that make a person more/less likely to engage in treatment (e.g., health status)?

Slides from lecture

**Does every research question
need an identification strategy?**

No!

**Correlation alone is okay!
Can lead to more focused causal questions later!**

BREAKING | Jan 14, 2022, 12:34pm EST | 145,393 views

Moderna Starts Human Trials Of mRNA Vaccine For Virus That Likely Causes Multiple Sclerosis



Robert Hart Forbes Staff

[Business](#)

I cover breaking news.

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TOPLINE Moderna recently launched early stage clinical trials for an mRNA vaccine against the Epstein-Barr virus (EBV), a common pathogen that infects almost everyone at some point in their lives, is the primary cause of mononucleosis and, according to a study published in the journal [Science](#) Thursday, likely causes multiple sclerosis (MS), offering hope the devastating neurological condition might be prevented.

Logic models, DAGs, and measurement

What's the difference between logic models and DAGs?

Can't I just remake my logic model in Dagitty and be done?

DAGs vs. Logic models

DAGs are a *statistical* tool

Describe a data-generating process
and isolate/identify relationships

Logic models are a *managerial* tool

Oversee the inner workings of a program and its theory

Berkeley Will Fully Close Its Streets to Create Giant Outdoor Dining Rooms

Berkeley is moving fast to expand outdoor dining

by Eve Batey | May 14, 2020, 1:02pm PDT

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June 11, 2020 3:40pm EDT


Cities can prepare for climate change emergencies by adding green spaces to help manage stormwater, heat stress and air quality. (Shutterstock)

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The COVID-19 pandemic has forced governments to weigh the benefits of keeping green spaces open against the public health concerns that come from their use. During the pandemic, playgrounds have been taped off, parks locked and access to outdoor spaces for recreation cut off.

Green spaces have positive effects on mental health, physical fitness, social cohesion and spiritual wellness. Although researchers say the coronavirus spreads more easily indoors than outdoors, they also believe the concentrated use of green spaces will increase the transmission of COVID-19.


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